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ABSTRACT
Kenneth Burke as Educator: What His Theories of Aesthetic Form
and (Non-Symbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action Suggest
for Teachers in the Literature Classroom
Tara T. Boyce
Department of English, BYU
Master of Arts
Burke scholars oftentimes overlook Burke’s fundamental role as educator and how his
work can and should be applied to the classroom. This paper explores Burke’s theoretical works
and centers on two concepts important to developing rhetorical skills necessary for functioning
and participating in a democratic society: his theory of aesthetic form and his distinction between
motion and action. Specifically, this paper (1) clarifies these concepts and explains how they
relate to each other and the emotional experience of literature, and (2) demonstrates how these
concepts work together to imply a new method of practicing rhetorical criticism in the literature
classroom necessary to meet Burke’s goals of education: to help students become critically
aware of the symbolic influences working upon them and to make critical judgments about them.
To do that, I explain Burke’s theory of form outlined in Counter-Statement, as clarified in
additional texts, and how this form engages readers in a sequential and dialogical process, which
creates in readers a specific emotional experience. I discuss how this experience subjects those
who encounter form to what I describe in Burke’s terms as a “motional” and consequently
passive experience. I then discuss how practicing a method of reflection during and after the
experience of form can help subject this experience to critique, into what Burke defined as the
realm of “action”—conscious, deliberative choice.
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Boyce 1
Introduction
In a private interview with Gregory Clark in July of 1989, Kenneth Burke explained that
two of his major theoretical works A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives, both of
which explore his concept of “symbolic action” and the role of critics to interpret others’
symbolic acts, were written as a result of teaching at Bennington College, a private liberal arts
school for women. According to Clark, Burke wrote these texts with the classroom in mind, to
teach pupils to ask questions. An interesting, though not too surprising concept: Kenneth Burke
as educator. Though he is considered primarily a philosopher, theorist, critic, and at times
remembered as a creative writer, Kenneth Burke was also a teacher of English at a variety of
college campuses across the U.S., including Kenyon College, University of Chicago, New
School for Social Research, Indiana University, Pennsylvania State University, and Syracuse
University (Enoch 274-5). Jessica Enoch points out that in addition to being a teacher, Burke
“considered a number of his critical texts to be educational in nature” (275). We see this in many
of his lectures, interviews, and theoretical writings, which provide strategies or “equipment” for
what he saw as one major role of public education: teaching students how to participate
peacefully in a democratic society with competing interests and motives (Cahill). And yet, Burke
scholars oftentimes overlook Burke’s fundamental role as educator and how his work can and
should be applied to the classroom.
Some have acknowledged Burke as an educator and analyzed his theoretical writings as
they reflect his pedagogical theories. Jessica Enoch, for example, explores Burke’s rhetorical
situation and how it influenced his educational motives as seen in his major pedagogical essay
“Linguistic Approach to Problems in Education” (LAPE). She argues that Burke’s teaching
philosophy centers on a “pedagogy of critical reflection,” which aims to help students practice
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peaceful living in the Cold War era. William Cahill explores and clarifies Burke’s ideas on the
goals of education to be that which helps students develop a “terminology” for analyzing human
motives in order to prepare students for discerning, in Burke’s words, the “‘clutter of machinery,
both technological and administrative, which civilization has amassed in its attempts to live well’”
(qtd. in Cahill). Other curriculum theorists like Rutten, Mottart, and Soetaert have implemented
and analyzed Burke’s methods for teaching rhetorical criticism discussed in LAPE—specifically
the dramatistic pentad method—into literature classrooms, providing case studies that verify the
effectiveness of these approaches in teaching students how to analyze symbolic acts.
These scholars have highlighted Burke for his educational contributions and similarly, I’d
like to draw more attention to Burke and his theoretical writings for their pedagogical potential.
How does Burke help instructors develop methods that teach students in a democratic society to
become rhetorically aware citizens, critical of the dominant social influences working upon them,
and specifically the role language plays in those influences? To answer that question, I’d like to
move beyond the techniques outlined in LAPE, which these scholars have already discussed—
Burke’s methods of indexing, terministic screening, the dramatistic pentad, and what Enoch
labels Burke’s “pedagogy of debate” (285-6)—and turn to Burke’s other theoretical works to
propose an additional method for teaching rhetorical criticism particularly in a literature
classroom that is implicit in Burke’s claim that literature is “equipment for living” (Philosophy
1-2, 296), that it is a means through which we discover “human ways of acting and forming
relations in the world” (Cahill)). In Counter-Statement Burke begins to describe a concept of
aesthetic form that readers can use to understand how they come to identify with the world an
author creates through the experience of reading it, a process that is profoundly rhetorical.
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The method I propose involves critical reflection on the emotions aroused in the
experience provided by the form of a literary text. This method is not explicitly outlined in any
of Burke’s writings. Rather, it is implicit in a set of his theoretical works and centers on two
concepts important to developing the rhetorical skills necessary for participating in a democratic
society: his theory of aesthetic form and his subsequent distinction between motion and action,
which explains how form operates. Specifically, my project here is twofold: (1) to clarify these
concepts and explain how they relate to each other in the emotional experience of an encounter
with a literary text, and (2) to explain the method for rhetorical criticism that follows that will
help students recognize the influences working upon them as they read and make critical
judgments about them. To do that, I will explain how literary form, as Burke outlined it in
Counter-Statement and clarified it in additional texts, engages readers in a sequential and
dialogical process that gives them a specific emotional experience. Second, I will discuss how
this experience subjects those who encounter it to what I will describe in Burke’s terms as a
“motional” and consequently passive experience. This is experience that happens to us rather
than experience we might choose by taking action. Much of the experience Burke describes in
his theory of literary form is “motional.” We can turn that experience toward our control by
subjecting this experience to critique, and so bring it into the realm of “action”—our conscious,
deliberative choice. I conclude with a discussion of Burke’s pedagogical motives and how this
method meets those motives by preparing students for conscious, critical judgments.
Form as Sequential and Dialogical and, Above All, Emotional
Many have discussed Burke’s theory of aesthetic form and how it can be applied to a
variety of contexts, including national narratives (Rutten, Mottart, and Soetaert), national parks
(Clark, Rhetorical Landscapes), popular films (Greene), local news stations (Gronbeck),
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congressional debates (Darr), and even gourmet food (Lindquist). None, however, have
discussed form specifically in terms of emotion and how this emotional experience develops
through what I will discuss as a sequential and dialogical process. Because I am interested in
pedagogy for the literature classroom, I will focus on how this happens in the reading of literary
texts.
For Burke, emotional arousal is both the purpose and the appeal of art. In CounterStatement, Burke defines literature as “written or spoken words,” and literature as art as
“literature designed for the express purpose of arousing emotions” (123). Burke defines art in
this way because as a rhetorical critic he is concerned with its rhetorical effects—in this case, the
rhetorical effects of having our emotions aroused. This is important to understand since it is
because of the power of emotion to change people that Burke presents his theory of aesthetic
form. For this reason, a further understanding of Burke’s theory of form as it impacts emotion is
necessary. Here I will explain how Burke’s theory of form is a sequential and dialogical process
aimed at prompting in others specific emotions about life experiences.
Form as Sequential
Burke best describes his theory of form in Counter-Statement, which he published in
1931. He writes: “Form in literature is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in
so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence”
(Counter-Statement 124). Burke uses terms such as “desire” and “anticipation” and “gratification”
to explain the experience of form as emotional. How this emotional experience is achieved is
through the sequencing of events. Burke demonstrates this in a letter to Matthew Cowley dated
November 20, 1924: “Form in art becomes defined by this system as the arousing of a desire and
the satisfaction of that desire. If I, by so many pages, awake in the reader the wish to see, let us
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say, a letter which one character has written to another, and at the proper moment produce that
letter—that is form” (Burke and Cowley 167). According to Burke, this progressive increase in
curiosity that ultimately reaches its climax is produced by an author creating an appetite in the
mind of readers and then satisfying that appetite at the opportune moment. This experience
involves a sequence of desires aroused by an author’s sequencing of events in a text. Each of
those desires, in sequences, will lead readers to anticipate and expect what comes next, an
essentially emotional process directed and manipulated by an author’s recounting of events.
Burke demonstrates how an author achieves this response with an example of how form
works in Hamlet. Burke writes that the psychology of form experienced in Hamlet “is not the
psychology of the hero,” in this case, Hamlet, “but the psychology of the audience” (CounterStatement 31). As readers, we know Hamlet will approach the ghost but not when or how for the
first time and the realization of those expectations at an opportune moment—in this case, the
fourth scene of the first act, after the “blare of trumpets,” when we are least expecting it,
although we’ve been expecting it all along. Experiencing this process of anticipation and
gratification through promises made by an artist is form, which imitates lifelike crescendos—
“The suspense of a rubber band which we see being tautened. We know that it will be snapped—
there is thus no ignorance of the outcome; our satisfaction arises from our participation in the
process, from the fact that the beginnings of the dialogue lead us to feel the logic of its close”
(Counter-Statement 145). For Burke, then, it is not the information itself that satisfies us (though
Burke does make a distinction between the psychology of form and this idea, the psychology of
information, where “the reader’s interest in the work is based primarily upon his ignorance of its
outcome” (145)), but the emotional process of experiencing the fulfillment of our desires and
expectations as those desires build upon each other and accumulate like in a crescendo.
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Experiencing this crescendo prompts in readers an emotional response: we are shocked, we are
outraged, we are exuberant. In this way, readers find themselves desiring, wanting, yearning
what an author intends for them. Readers not only witness or observe an author’s experience;
they experience an author’s pattern of emotional anticipation and desires, expectations and
fulfillment, as the literature takes them through a sequence of events.
By sequence, Burke does not necessarily mean that literature must recount events in the
temporal order in which they occur. Anneliese Watt points out that Burke struggled with
defining or restricting narrative in temporal terms because plots that rely solely on temporality
are, in his own words, “simple” and “arbitrary.” He writes about this in a letter dated March 15,
1921 to Scofield Thayer, the editor of The Dial, when he compares literature to music,
distinguishing both music and literature from other forms of art because they center on time. He
writes: “Literature and music, because they exist in time—in contradistinction to painting,
sculpture, and architecture, which exist in space—had accepted this arbitrary thread of progress
because it was the simplest method of establishing a temporal gradation which, while being
graded, also retained the feeling of unity” (qtd. in Watt 51). Perhaps Burke described the “thread
of progress” and “temporal gradation” of literature as arbitrary and simple because even the
smallest, inconsequential narratives exist in time—I get up from the couch; then I walk to the
kitchen; then I heat up my TV dinner. Though this may be narrative, it is not necessarily
narrative art. Burke’s ambivalence about literary works that rely simply on time as an organizing
or unifying principle is emphasized when he contrasts this type of narrative with what he
describes as “an essentially artistic progression,” or what we might interpret as a higher level or
more sophisticated narrative:
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An essentially artistic progression, however, would have its basis in something
more exact than this mere illusion of development (such as for instance a
sequence of form units, expositional, argumentative, oratorical, narrative, or to
look at it another way, lugubrious, brilliant, matter-of-fact, sullen, agitated,
remote, chaotic, etc.) . . . In this way the elements of a prose fiction would be
juxtaposed like the colors on a canvass: because one quality called forth another.
(qtd. in Watt 51)
This “calling forth” of elements is the creation and fulfillment of desires, or form, and the
experience of having those desires created and fulfilled is emotional. How the author calls forth
those elements through the sequence of desires can and often does vary from the timeline of a
plot.
This process of calling forth is slow and deliberate in literature. Unlike a painting or a
photo in which others experience an artist’s emotional argument all at once, form is a process of
building—an author arouses initial emotional responses in others and builds upon those emotions
with new information to create new emotions. I’d like to focus on the word “process” as it
pertains to form because, as I will demonstrate, Burke’s theory of form is a dialogical process
between an author and an audience, an exchange of ideas and emotional experience. In this way,
literature is rhetorical because its very form, whether narrative or not, conditions readers one
emotion at a time—as a narrative does—to move up, toward accepting an author’s emotional
experience.
Form as Dialogical
In his essay “Rhetoric and Poetics,” Burke defines his theory of form not as mere selfexpression, but as communication: “I began in the aesthete tradition,” Burke writes, “with the

Boyce 8
stress upon self-expression. Things started moving for me in earnest when, as attested in
Counter-Statement, I made the shift from ‘self-expression’ to ‘communication.’ The theory of
form (and ‘forms’) centers in that distinction” (305). As Fritch and Leeper point out, Burke puts
little emphasis on formalistic standards to evaluate aesthetic works; likewise, we might say
Burke puts little emphasis on formalistic standards to create aesthetic works. The only standard
Burke puts on aesthetic works is effectiveness—whether or not a work of art communicates by
arousing particular emotional responses in an audience by creating “an appetite in the mind of an
auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite” (Counter-Statement 31). But Burke doesn’t
provide much detail about how to achieve this form. In fact, the definition itself is a definition of
effectiveness. Hence, Fritch and Leeper conclude: “The arguer [or author, in this case] who best
understands the thinking of the audience will more likely be able to provide a valid form for that
audience.”
Form, then, for Burke, is a process in which an author must anticipate, react, and adjust to
the perceived beliefs, values, and needs of an audience in order to evoke the correct emotional
response within them. Therefore, we must think of form as an emotional experience of which
readers must be convinced—that this is a valid form of “feeling” and learning about life
experiences. In order to convince readers, authors undergo an exchange of ideas in the creation
process, similar to an exchange of ideas in a two-person communicative act. If literature, as
Burke points out in Counter-Statement, must ring true to the readers’ experiences lived outside
of a literary text, an author must always have the audience at the forefront of her mind as she
selects events, characters, acts, and scenes to narrate as she conditions the audience to expect and
desire particular events, qualities, or outcomes. Though this exchange exists only in the mind of
the author as she creates the literature, an exchange is happening with an imagined audience.
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So form is not just communicative as Deborah Tannen means that term—aiming for
“shared meaning, as well as perceiving coherence and one’s sense in the world” (qtd. in
Povozhaev 48); it is also dialogical in the sense that Gregory Clark explains it as an “exchange of
assertions and responses” (Dialogue 30), in which one “communicate[s] not to others, but with
them” (Dialogue 2), even if that exchange is happening between a reader and an author
represented through a text. John Rodden explains that this process of communication, which
aims to adjust people to ideas or ideas to people, ranges on a continuum of two poles. The first
pole consists of an author telling an audience “only what they want to hear,” while the other pole
consists of what we might consider dogmatic: “my viewpoint is the only reasonable/moral/etc.
one” (154). Literary acts may reside anywhere along this continuum; however, I believe Burke
would place effective literature, meaning literature with a compelling form, somewhere in the
middle, since an author must negotiate her own wants and beliefs with those of her audience.
This process of influencing must be a series of steps that leads readers from point A to Z.
It is one step to lead readers to anticipate a letter; it is quite another to lead readers to anticipate a
protagonist’s suicide, as we see in Kate Chopin’s The Awakening. So, for example in Jane
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, Austen conditions her audience to accept Darcy as a valid and
equal partner for Elizabeth one step at time: (1) his apology letter that explains his misdeed
toward Jane, (2) his payment to Wickman to restore the reputation of Lydia, (3) his influence in
reuniting Jane and Bingley. Insomuch as readers accept these steps—meaning, they accept these
actions as appropriate and distinguished forms of love—they will anticipate and be gratified by
the match to come later, as the author intends for them, in this way, feeling the “correct”
emotions an author intends for them. By correct, I mean the emotional experience an author
intends for the reader to experience. This makes more sense if, for example, at the end of
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Twilight, we do not want or desire Bella and Edward to end up together when the plot has led us
to believe we should. In this case, we do not experience emotions of gratification, but instead
emotions of annoyance or disappointment.
So form, for Burke, is dialogical, a communicative act exchanged between both author
and reader, the result of which arouses particular emotional experiences in the reader. I have
discussed the role authors play in this exchange with their audiences, but what part do readers
play in this dialogical process? Burke’s concept of form doesn’t explicitly explore the role
readers play in their experiences of form, for example, the role reader response plays in a
reader’s experience. Not all readers respond identically to a text and not all readers are
identically affected by the expectations and desires aroused within them through form. Burke
indirectly acknowledges this in Counter-Statement when he explains his term “modes of
experience” and how both our physical bodies (“organisms”) and our environments contribute to
our variety of interpretations/understandings of the situations around us. He explains here that
because of these two factors, none of us will have identical experiences: “The range of universal
experiences may be lived on a mountain top, at sea, among a primitive tribe, in a salon—the
modes of experience so differing in each instance that people in two different schemes of living
can derive very different universal experiences [emotions, perceptions, sensations, etc. (148)]
from an identical event” (150). And later: “[Patterns of experience] result from the combination
of organism and environment—and organisms presumably differ as much as environments. A
more sensitive organism, for instance, might need a less emphatic environmental condition to
cause it pain” (151-2). Burke acknowledges that because of these differences, organisms,
including readers, will not experience the same responses in relation to the same text. And yet,
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Burke doesn’t adequately accommodate the variety of readers’ experiences in his discussion of
form. Therefore, his theory of form needs further developing.
Louise Rosenblatt and John Rodden provide explanations that help us better develop
Burke’s concept of form by taking into account the reader. I acknowledge that Rosenblatt differs
in perspective from Burke—Rosenblatt emphasized reader-response criticism and therefore
centered her discussion on readers’ interpretations, whereas Burke emphasized rhetorical
criticism and centered his discussion on artists’ influence. To clarify, I am not using Rosenblatt
to support Burke’s theory of form as it is. Instead, I use Rosenblatt to complete Burke’s theory of
form by discussing how a reader contributes to the emotional experience of form. In Literature
as Exploration, Rosenblatt explains the fundamental influence a reader has in the experience of
encountering a text. She writes:
I have used the terms transaction and transactional to emphasize the essentiality
of both reader and text, in contrast to other theories that make one or the other
determinate. Interaction, the term generally used, suggests two distinct entities
acting on each other, like two billiard balls. Transaction lacks such mechanistic
overtones and permits emphasis on the to-and-fro, spiraling, nonlinear,
continuously reciprocal influence of reader and text in the making of meaning.
The meaning—the poem—‘happens’ during the transaction between the reader
and the signs on the page. (xvi)
Rosenblatt acknowledges that aesthetic experiences are transactions between readers and an
author represented through the text. Through form, the sequence of events may guide readers to
feel a certain way about the experience, but Rosenblatt explains that as readers read a text, they
bring their own experiences outside of the text to verify/validate/challenge/explore the text, in a
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way, “negotiating” with the experience an author provides for them. John Rodden similarly
explains that while reading a narrative, an audience will respond to an author—“bending toward
him or resisting him” (154) and that often, readers will “[fill] in the missing links of [the]
argument, placing it within the context of their own experience and relating to it in their own
idiosyncratic way” (Rodden 154). Because readers insert their own backgrounds and this process
influences their interpretations and consequently, their experiences with a text, readers will
experience a text in a way that is most personal and meaningful to them. It is for this reason that
I believe Burke saw the powerful rhetorical influence of aesthetic works. Through this dialogical
process, readers are moved emotionally by what an author communicates to them through the
text as well as what they bring with them to the text. This allows readers to be moved by a piece
of literature, as Burke puts it, from “within” (“(Nonsymbolic) Motion” 829). Though readers are
still in some ways subject to the experience an author gives them (for example they are given
certain characters and situations within a text in which they can respond to), by inserting their
own backgrounds and experiences into interpreting a narrative experience provided for them,
readers’ emotional responses to a text can be intensely powerful.
The Effects of the Emotional Experience of Form
If form aims to arouse emotional experiences in readers and readers approach form by
inserting their own experiences in order to be moved emotionally by it, what are the implications
for Burke? As a rhetorical critic, Burke was concerned with the consequential effects of these
emotional responses and Thomas Alexander suggests why. As readers, we don’t just get
emotional; we get emotional about something, which suggests emotion is a means rather than an
end goal in art. He gives the following example of King Lear to demonstrate how emotion works
as an effect and a means:
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To say that King Lear expressed the feeling or emotion of ‘King Lear,’ is not to
answer a question, but to raise one. It calls for a patient and detailed experiencing
of the work, the revelation of character through language and action, the
relationship of the events, awareness of the underlying themes and the ambiguities,
and an envisagement of the whole as dramatically enacted. The emotion evoked
by the work will be about the work. (222)
So the emotions we experience through form are an effect and a means toward interpreting
experience. In this way, as recent studies in neuroscience have verified, depending on the quality
and intensity of emotion, we make judgments out of our emotional experiences—about the
stimuli that prompt these emotional responses.
Mark Johnson, Robert C. Solomon, Lea Povozhaev, and Brian Jackson have discussed
how emotional responses, which range on a scale of pain and pleasure and intensity, determine
our animal needs, our personal relationships, our social relations, and our cultural institutions and
practices (See Johnson 283). In other words, our emotions impact our actions, which impact how
we respond to and work with others. In life experiences, for example, watching a man yell at
another man may evoke an emotional response of discomfort or displeasure in us that causes us
to plug our ears, leave the room, or tell the man to “knock it off.” Similarly, witnessing a man
kill another man may evoke a more intense emotional experience in us, somewhere along the
lines of fear and horror. Our emotional reaction in this case may prompt us to run, hide, fight, or
call 9-1-1, and suffer from traumatic stress for a long time afterward. Based on that emotional
experience, we may conclude how thoroughly murder is wrong, bad, something we should
“reject.” Consequently, we might lock our doors, build a fence around our homes, or eventually

Boyce 14
propose laws that punish those who practice this behavior. Emotion, in both of these cases,
prompts the judgments and actions we make.
Form in literature acts as a stimulus similar to stimuli in real life experiences because it
prompts real, neurological emotional responses within us. Of course, as Burke points out in
Counter-Statement, our experiences in life are much more intense and much more immediate
than our aesthetic experiences: “A mere headache,” for example, “is more ‘authentic’ than a
great tragedy; the most dismal love affair is more worth experiencing in actual life than the
noblest one in a poem” (77). However, emotional response, when achieved either through real
life stimuli or form in literature, will have its effects on our judgments and perceptions, however
small they may be. The only difference is that the emotional experience achieved through literary
form is prompted and manipulated and by an artist, whereas emotional experience derived from
real life is not. In this way, literature is rhetorical for Burke because it explores experiences in
life and interprets them through form to create particular emotional experiences within others.
An example of how emotional experience in life differs from emotional experience
through form is if from the moment I wake up, I were to make a list of all my observances and
interactions with my environment. For example:
·

Alarm ringing

·

Darkness

·

I blink

·

Husband nudges me

·

A bird chirps outside a window

·

I turn on the light

·

My phone rings
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·

I don’t answer the phone

·

I brush my teeth

My experience here is random—a list of bullet point stimuli, which mean nothing in and of
themselves, though they may prompt emotional responses within me. Perhaps my alarm ringing
startles me, or my husband nudging me annoys me, or my phone ringing irritates me. But let’s
say I am so moved by what the bird chirping out the window means to me in contrast with my
phone or alarm ringing that I write a poem to capture and communicate this experience to others.
To achieve this, I begin with focusing on what the husband nudging me or the alarm ringing
signals to me. I leave out some qualities or objects or events, while adding or emphasizing others.
Perhaps I change the scene, or exaggerate the quality of annoyance. I then lead readers to
anticipate some resolution from this current conflict. I introduce the call of the bird in the
distance, then the fall of sunlight on the windowsill, then the growing clarity and beauty of the
bird’s call as it lands on a branch just outside my window. Through the sequencing of these
events, I guide my readers through a process of appreciating the simple beauty amidst the
busyness and redundancies (or annoyances) of each day. As readers read my poem, they
participate in my emotional experience, which acts as a stimulus that evokes particular emotional
responses within them. Though my readers bring with them their own backgrounds and
experiences to the text, which accounts for the way in which we all experience a work of art
somewhat differently (we all select and discriminate qualities within a work of art), my poem
becomes a vehicle through which readers experience my pattern of perceiving and feeling
experience around me. In this way, I direct or manipulate emotional experience for my readers
by crafting a sequence of expectations and desires for them—they experience an emotional
experience (my emotional experience) secondhand.
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Through the very act of sequencing events and ideas, an implicit argument is created by
an artist: See this in this way; Feel this in this way. So, when Burke writes in Counter-Statement
that “experience is less the aim of art than the subject of art; art is not experience, but something
added to experience” (77), he means art directs or creates specific experiences for readers to
better direct their emotional responses. In this way, art argues something about experience—art
communicates a judgment about experience. This is what Burke seems to mean when he explains
that art “strikes its own specific attitude,” or invites others to “Come attitudinize with me” (Late
Poems 26).
Emotion as (Non-Symbolic) Motion
The key, then, for Burke, is to be conscious of our emotions, what prompts them, and to
make conscious judgments about them, since these judgments impact how we interpret and
approach the world around us. But consciousness and judgment are vague terms so in order to
discuss them, I turn to Burke’s theory of non-symbolic motion and symbolic action to discuss
how emotion exists within the realm of motion and the implications of that.
In the correspondence between Burke and Wayne Booth, Burke often refers to what he
calls his “motion/action pair” as the starting point for analyzing all of his theoretical work. In a
letter dated September 16, 1978, Burke writes, “I’m so sold on my Motion/Action routine…, I
have to approach all those things from my starting-point, for nothing else seems quite real.” In a
letter dated September 18, 1978 Burke further emphasized, “I want to see everything discussed
in connection with that tie-up [‘my Motion/Action routine’].” And finally, in a letter dated
January 2, 1979 Burke makes the comment, “I insist upon the motion/action pair as the
groundwork of a secular nomenclature for the discussion of human relations.” Clearly, this
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motion/action pair is important to Burke and for this reason I will explain the distinction and how
this relates to experiencing emotion through form and making judgments about those emotions.
Non-symbolic motion, for Burke, consists of the natural, biological, physical experiences
that work within or upon us. This is what happens in the world or in our physical bodies, whether
or not we are consciously aware of it. In contrast, symbolic action consists of the conscious,
intentional, motivated, and symbolic experiences that attempt to make meaning of motion. In
other words, as self-conscious human beings try to make sense of motion in their physical
surroundings or within them, as they attach symbolic meaning to motion through language and
other symbol systems, they begin to operate in the realm of action. Burke describes the
difference between these two concepts in the following passage:
There can be motion without action (as the sea can go on thrashing about whether
or not there are animals that have a word for it).
There can be no action without motion (as we animals could not have words for
anything except for the motions of our nervous systems and the vibrations that
carry our words from one of us to another through the air or that make words
visible on the page). (“(Nonsymbolic) Motion” 814)
Both “systems” of experience impact our ways of understanding and interacting with the world
and both are important aspects in influencing our quality of life, our own “motional” experiences,
and actions. For example, an external motion, such as a tsunami, can cause severe damage to our
physical surroundings. The impact of this can affect us in different ways, the first being
“motional,” the second being “actional.” For example, how the tsunami can have “motional”
effects is if, upon seeing the tsunami approach, our physical bodies experience shock, with or
without our knowing it. Our legs freeze, our throats become dry. Or, let’s say, as the tsunami
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approaches and we’re hit by a large sharp object, and our physical bodies respond by bleeding,
increasing our body temperatures and our white blood cell count in order to fight any potential
bacteria or infection. These are embodied “motional” responses that happen within us as a result
of an external motion, in this case, the tsunami. Both external and embodied motional effects
exist outside our realm of control. How these motions can have “actional” effects is if they cause
us to consciously act. For example, if, when we see the tsunami coming, we decide to run and we
strategize a solution by telling others to run and find shelter. We are now consciously reacting;
we are acting. In this case, the motion of the tsunami has affected our actions: what we need and
want and choose, including our conscious actions about what to do with our new circumstances,
which is expressed through our symbolic actions. We assign meaning to the tsunami and label it
a disaster—something negative—and we make a concentrated effort to respond to it. The
moment we begin to interpret through language (including thought, for example) or consciously
do something about motion, we operate within the realm of “action.”
Symbolic action, too, can have motional and actional effects. For example, a new
government policy (a symbolic act) to increase gun control can cause motional reactions in
others who may experience in their physical bodies emotions such as anger, or joy (depending on
who you talk to). The policy can also cause actional responses. A group of protesters decide to
gather outside the White House and together protest the new law. Or perhaps because of the new
policy, gun killings increase or decrease as a response to or an interpretation of the new law. In
this way, both motion and action have motional and actional effects; the only difference is in the
realm of motion, we have no control, whereas in the realm of action, we do.
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Burke seems especially preoccupied with the effects symbolic actions have, since it is the
realm in which we do have control. In a 1973 letter to Booth, dated April 5, Burke implicitly
demonstrates this concern. He writes:
Thus, if a certain chemical is injected into the blood stream, and a rise in bloodpressure results, here obviously is an event in the realm of motion. But if the same
rise in blood-pressure produced by a piece of true or false information (in the oldfashioned meaning of the term ‘information’), here the sheerly physiological
motions are obviously affected by ‘symbolicity’ (i.e., ‘action’).
Burke explains here that motional reactions can occur from symbolic actions—in this case,
“information”—whether that be true or false information. What’s interesting in this passage is
Burke’s use of the word “But” (“But, if the same rise in blood pressure . . .”) because it suggests
that Burke is concerned not only with the effects of motion or action, but the cause of motional
reactions. Otherwise, why must it matter how (either motion or action) the blood-pressure rises
as long as it rises? The effects of the rise in blood-pressure will be the same on the physical body,
regardless of whether or not it was intended, motivated, etc. In this way, Burke differs from the
Behaviorists who only consider effects (scene), rather than on actor, act, and agency, elements of
his pentad. Hence, Burke’s comment in a letter to Booth: “As vs. the Behaviorists, I absolutely
insist upon a Dualistic position. And with regard to any and all other Isms, I insist upon the
motion/action pair as the groundwork of a secular nomenclature for the discussion of human
relations” (Jan. 2, 1979). Burke, here, demonstrates a particular concern with how symbolic
action—as it is motivated by an actor—impacts our motion(s), and consequently, our human
relations. Burke seems particularly concerned with symbolic action because symbolic action
creates some responsibility. In “sheer” motion, or what Burke sometimes refers to as
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“physiological motion,” there is no attitude, motivation, or desire. However, in symbolic action,
there is, and because of this, Burke argues that we should especially be aware. And because of
this, rhetoric as a means for inducing cooperation in each other is necessary—to have at least
some say in the symbolic actions that impact or become our motion.
Emotion, as I discussed it earlier, exists in the realm of motion. Emotion is something
that occurs within us as an automatic response to a stimulus; it is an experience of internal
motion. Mark Johnson, who synthesizes recent discussions of emotions, defines emotion as the
“neural, chemical, and behavioral responses to various stimuli that typically have positive or
negative value” (58). Robert C. Solomon explains that these emotions are always triggered and
that they happen in response to something, a stimulus, even though we may not be aware that we
are experiencing them. Johnson similarly points out that emotions are not always interpreted or
conscious by those who experience them. In fact, our bodies respond to situations emotionally
first—our palms sweat, our hearts race—before we understand that we are feeling an emotion,
for example, fear. For this reason, Johnson makes a distinction between emotion and feeling,
stating, “Emotional responses can occur long before we become aware that we are feeling an
emotion. . . emotional responses can operate beneath the level of consciousness” (59, emphasis
original). Emotion “happens” to us, similarly to how a fever or cold “happens” to us as a result of
a stimulus that triggers a response in us. We cannot control the stimulus that prompts the
emotional reaction or illness (although we can try to prevent ourselves from encountering the
stimulus); neither can we necessarily control our initial emotional bodily response to the stimulus.
We can, however, practice conscious awareness of the responses within us, what caused them,
and consequently, what to do with them. And for this reason, I propose a method of critical
reflection on our emotions as we experience literary form.
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Reflection and Judgment as (Symbolic) Action
In the preface to the first edition of Counter-Statement, Burke explains how his chapter
“Lexicon-Rhetoricae,” which outlines and breaks down his theory of form, provides a “machine
for criticism” or method for evaluating works of art. He clarifies the purpose of this method as
rhetorical criticism or “judgment” in the following statement:
As for our set-piece, the “Lexicon Rhetoricae,” it is frankly intended as a
machine—machine for criticism . . . . It is a kind of judgment machine, designed
to serve as an instrument for clarifying critical issues (not so much for settling
issues as for making the nature of a controversy more definite). It seeks to
perform this function by working out a set of “pivotal” or ‘key” terms for
discussing the processes of literary appeal. (ix)
Here we see Burke as educator. Here we see Burke proposing that his theory be applied to the
classroom and that it be applied with the end goal of teaching judgment or criticism. Burke
implies that reflection on and discussion of these processes through developing a vocabulary of
form and discussing how it works in texts is what teaches judgment or criticism. And if, as Burke
writes in his chapter “Lexicon Rhetoricae,” “form is the appeal” (138) of literature, and form is
the creation and fulfillment of desires, an emotional experience, reflection on and discussion of
emotion, too, is key to teaching judgment or criticism of literary texts. Emotion may happen to
us as we experience form, but if we can learn to reflect on those emotions in order to make
judgments about how they are affecting us, we can gain power over the symbolic acts that
influence our motions: our emotions.
By power, I mean we can make choices about how to interpret and respond to these
influences. I bring up this idea of individual choice because I believe Burke was especially
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concerned with it as he developed wide-ranging methods for practicing rhetorical criticism in his
pedagogical theories. Burke acknowledged that much of what we need and want and choose to
do is influenced by symbolic actions outside of our control, and therefore, being critically aware
of how others’ acts, specifically, how others’ symbolic acts affect us is important for Burke
because that gives us choices—whether or not to wield to those influences. This is the basis of
Burke’s pedagogical philosophy. Unless we are paying attention, the arousal of emotions can
unconsciously shape our judgments and consequently, what we identify with—whether that be a
character or an attitude or an ideology represented in a book, or a person or a movement we
encounter in our real lives. This process can occur as a category of motion—it can happen to us
without our knowing of it. Our critical task is to put that experience into the realm of action by
subjecting it to choice and judgment. This takes us from the passive, “motion” realm of
unconscious motivations and places us in the “action” realm of conscious, thoughtful,
deliberative judgment.
How we subject our emotions to choice and judgment is through reflection and
discussion. Experiencing an author’s pattern of emotions, or desires, through encountering form,
directs our own emotional responses during the reading of a text and this experience may play a
role in directing our judgments about life experiences outside of a text. (For example, in Poe’s
“The Tell-Tale Heart,” by directing our emotional experiences, Poe can also direct our
judgments about a subject outside of the text. When encountering the insanity of Poe’s narrator,
we not only tend to feel painful emotions (such as terror, disgust, repulsion), we may
subsequently make judgments about insanity and characters who are insane outside of texts. In
this way, our emotions guide or inform our judgments about the subjects within the art object, as
well as subjects outside of the art object.) Since form creates emotional responses within us,
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which are bodily experiences, carefully examining those bodily experiences is important if we
are to consider ourselves as being rhetorically critical. And because we all experience emotional
response somewhat differently, this reflection should be based on our personal emotional
experiences.
Burke understood the significance of the individual experience because he understood the
role the individual body played in both impacting our experiences as well as critiquing them. He
writes in “Art—and the First Rough Draft of Living,”
As regards individuality, I assume that we should start as always by recognizing
this fact (not a very edifying one but nonetheless basic and undeniable): My
particular physical pleasures and pains are mine, not yours--and your particular
physical pleasures and pains are yours, not mine. Though in our regional or
national affiliations, and in our use of a common language, we are members of
groups, thus sharing in a collective identity, to a large extent, our physical
pleasures and pains are our private property. This state of affairs is due to the
centrality of the nervous system. (162-3)
Ann Branaman explains that Burke understood that the individual body played a significant role
in critiquing dominant systems and allowed for us to alienate ourselves from the dominant
communities and ideologies of which we are all a part. In this way, our physical bodies become
critical sources for judgment if we are aware of the experiences of our physical bodies and learn
to make choices about them. For this reason, I argue that teachers of literature should implement
discussion and activities that prompt students’ awareness of and appropriate reflection on their
personal emotional experiences during and after experiencing narrative form.
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Pedagogical theorists like John Dewey, Louise Rosenblatt, and more recently, Kathleen
Yancey, have made strong arguments for why teaching reflective thinking in the classroom is
constructive to learning and important in a democratic classroom. Dewey argued for reflective
thinking because students learn through practice in the classroom not what to think, but “how to
think well” (34). The practice of systematic reflective thinking, Dewey believed, would build
habits of thinking processes transferable to thinking activities outside of the classroom.
Rosenblatt argued for reflection because she acknowledges the differing experiences readers
bring to texts and the need for students to learn to negotiate their experiences with the
experiences of others, including authors. Similarly, Yancey makes reflective writing exercises
central to her curriculum, explaining that the purpose of these reflective assignments is not only
to increase learning and awareness of self because awareness is critical to rhetorical criticism,
but also to make learning, reading, and writing more personal and meaningful to ninety-five
percent of the reading public who will not become English majors (ix). None of these scholars,
however, have proposed implementing reflection of emotional response to texts, particularly
while experiencing those emotions, which is what I advocate here.
If, as Dewey said, reflective writing is goal-oriented and encourages habits of systematic
thinking, what is the goal of reflective writing on our emotional experiences? Beyond awareness
of our emotional responses to texts, I advocate for reflecting on and making judgments about our
emotions in relation to a text. The goal of reflective thinking should be critical judgment and
critical judgment cannot occur without an understanding of how our emotions are being
influenced. To understand how our emotions are being influenced, we must be aware of the
changes in our emotions, as they occur, as well as after in order to form appropriate, conscious
judgments. And since form, as Burke implies, is a sequential and dialectical process, this is
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particularly important. Therefore, the following questions are the types of questions teachers may
ask their students to reflect upon during their reading:
1.

What emotions and desires am I experiencing?

2.

How is this text manipulating those desires? (Think of when your emotions began
and/or changed. Track these changes if you can. Any words or events that
specifically triggered these emotional responses within you?)

3.

Which emotions or desires do you feel comfortable accepting? Why/why not?

4.

What do those emotions do to your understanding of experience in this story? In
other words, how do you feel about this interpretation of experience, how it is
portrayed by this author? Do you agree? Disagree?

And after their reading experience, students may consider the following questions:
1.

If literature argues about “what life means” (Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction 141), what
is this author arguing?

2.

How does this author sequence events in order to make that argument?

3.

Do you agree with how this author interprets experience? Why/why not? What do
you accept? What do you reject?

One thing I want to point out in these reflective questions is that students must learn how
to discern both the possible positive and negative influences of a text. In Modern Dogma and the
Rhetoric of Assent, Wayne Booth responds to rhetorical critics that focus on the negative aspects
of rhetorical influence—being aware of the Hitlers, the religious fanatics, etc. However, Booth
argues, equally, if not more importantly, for the positive aspects of rhetorical influence, which
encourage mind and body to aspire higher. Not only do we guard ourselves against degrading
and destructive influence, we must also aspire for elevating, inspiring, wholesome influence at
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the individual and collective level. Wayne Booth calls this an attitude of “Why not?” or assent.
Unlike Booth, however, I don’t believe we should teach our students to approach texts with an
attitude of automatic acceptance, or the attitude of “innocent/right until proven guilty” that
Booth suggests. Nor do I support what he calls the modern dogma theory either: that all
influences are “guilty until proven innocent.” Instead, I adopt a neutral attitude that encourages
looking for both the positive and negative influences of aesthetic experiences. This implies that
practicing rhetorical criticism means discerning both that which inspires and that which degrades.
(This kind of thinking, of course, also implies discerning neutral influence that doesn’t
necessarily lean one way or the other.) To teach this approach to thinking and rhetorical criticism
allows for us to build upon our understandings of both good and bad, rather than just focusing on
one side of the spectrum. This approach allows for a more wholesome education that creates
open and critical thinkers.
Of course, one thing teachers must always be wary of is emotional response based in
misunderstanding, poor reading comprehension, or outright boredom or frustration as a result of
a student’s experiences outside of the text. For this reason, students must be encouraged to share
their responses with others, so that the class together can explore and provide alternate points of
view. Kathleen Yancey similarly pushes for this kind of collective dialogue, as it is most fitting
in a literature classroom:
In a classroom setting, particularly a classroom setting where literature is the
focus, where collaborative learning is common, and where performance is a part
of the delivered curriculum, reflection is concurrently an individual and a social
opportunity to pause, to deliberate, to consider and to embody alternatives, and to
articulate the curricula and the learning within and across them. (101)
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Robert Kane also argues for this kind of teaching that encourages learning more together in
Through the Moral Maze. Kane uses Plato’s metaphor of the elephant, how all of us, touching
different parts of the elephant, only know what we encounter with the elephant—one of us
touches the foot, another the tail, another a tusk. In order to learn more about the elephant as a
whole, we begin to share our different viewpoints of the elephant with each other. Even those
with ill-intentions (perhaps someone makes up a part of the elephant) or those ignorantly
touching the grass, rather than the elephant, may help us reevaluate and understand more of what
it is we believe and find meaningful or significant about the elephant. For example, if someone
suddenly shouts out, “What if what we feel doesn’t even exist and we’re imagining it?” we might
need to think about our senses, whether or not we trust them, and whether or not we want to
continue touching the elephant. Even these viewpoints can contribute to our understanding of
what the elephant is by helping us develop what the elephant is not. To bring this back to our
discussion here—the sharing of emotional responses to literary form—students can learn how
others feel or respond to a text and compare or contrast their own experiences. Through the
process, they can learn more about their own experiences and reevaluate them.
Burke’s Educational Motives
In “Responsibilities of National Greatness,” Burke explains that whatever influences our
identification choices or what we choose to identify with—with what or whom we choose to
align ourselves, whether that be a person, a country, an organization, a material, an idea, etc., is
rhetorical. In other words: What we choose to identify ourselves and what we choose to identify
ourselves against are rhetorical questions for Burke, which, I believe, caused him to explore how
we choose to identify with something or someone and to develop pedagogical methods for
critiquing these choices.
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I bring up Burke’s concept of identification as the object of rhetorical influence because
emotion is the initial pathway to influencing those identification choices. The pleasurable or
painful emotional experiences we have in response to a stimulus prompts the choices we make
about whether or not to identify with the stimulus. That which influences our emotions, then, has
the potential to influence our identities, or our identification choices. Literary form particularly
shapes what we want and identify with through the emotional experience an author provides us.
Readers can become subject to the emotions an author gives them during an experience of form:
an author gives readers desires to desire. As readers experience an author’s sequencing of events
and accept the outcome of those events as believable and satisfying, they participate in a process
of identification with an author.
Readers may not notice this identification occurring through their desires and
expectations except when it does not occur. I mentioned earlier how if at the end of Twilight, we
do not want or desire Bella and Edward to end up together when the plot has led us to believe we
should, we may refuse to identify with an author, consequently forming an alternate
identification. This is, whether trivial or profound, a process of identity formation. Whether we
are consciously aware of it or not, the emotional experience of the text causes us to reevaluate
our own understanding of conflict and experience demonstrated in the text. By accepting an
author’s experience, we may reinforce or confirm our understanding of experience in real life,
which, on a scale of intensity, will influence how we at least think about and potentially respond
to or act toward similar experiences in the future. This is still a transformation because it
strengthens previous beliefs and attitudes. Similarly, by rejecting an author’s experience, we
develop our own judgment of experience itself—what it means, how to handle it, etc.—by
forming judgments about what it is not.
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Understanding a concept in terms of what it is not is how Lawrence Prelli, Floyd
Anderson, and Matthew Althouse define Burke’s general concept of recalcitrance. Specifically,
they argue Burke believed recalcitrance to mean “the factors that substantiate a statement, the
factors that incite a statement, and the factors that correct a statement” (97). This definition of
recalcitrance can include both non-symbolic motions and symbolic actions that
challenge/revise/provide an alternate view of reality, which, consequently, expand our
understanding of our own experiences. For Burke, recalcitrant materials, including literary
narratives, act as a catalyst for developing a more critical point of view of our experiences as
these materials prompt us to reconsider and perhaps revise our assumptions, beliefs, and
worldviews. In this case, literature, a symbolic act which creates “motional” responses within us
(emotions) that challenge or cause us to question our expectations by providing contradictory or
previously unperceived ideas, can expand our understanding of life in general, how we perceive
the world, and how we negotiate our identities within this world. In this way, both acts of
accepting and rejecting affect identity since both acts help shape our beliefs and understanding of
life experiences and how to handle them. The key is to reflect on how our emotions influence
those conscious or unconscious identifications during and after reading in order to consciously
choose what to align ourselves with or against.
My point here is that everyone needs to be conscious of how art, and particularly,
literature, influences us to make judgments about whether or not to accept that influence. I have
described one method for teachers of literature to do so that would advance Burke’s pedagogical
motives, or goals, that I share. For Burke, education involves recognizing and understanding the
symbolic acts that influence our choices. That is why Burke expanded his category of rhetoric, of
the influences we should subject to critique, beyond traditional argumentation into non-
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traditional regions, particularly into modes of expression such as art, broadly defined. This is the
point of his book Counter-Statement and why he developed the dramatistic pentad and indexing
methods outlined in LAPE. Burke was not only concerned with how explicit arguments work on
our emotions, but also how the pervasive implicit arguments we encounter work on them. In fact,
Burke seemed especially preoccupied with the effect implicit arguments have on us because
these symbolic acts have the potential to be even more powerful in shaping the emotions that
comprise our identification choices because we are not used to the idea that entertainment or
high art are rhetorical. We tend to approach both with our critical guard down, leaving ourselves
vulnerable because we are not attending to how we are being influenced. This is not to say that
art is malicious and devilishly manipulative. However, having witnessed two world wars, the
development of the atomic bomb, and multiple genocides during his lifetime, Burke emphasized
conscious rhetorical criticism in the classroom to teach that being aware of how symbolic acts
have motional and actional influence is necessary for personal and societal peace. It is for this
reason that I, too, have focused on how literature is particularly and powerfully rhetorical
because it creates emotions and desires within our physical bodies that have the potential to
impact our judgments and actions.
Conclusion
I make this case because as an undergraduate and graduate student at Brigham Young
University studying both English literature and creative writing, the idea that art is rhetorical was
foreign to me, and generally rejected by teachers and peers. My study of literature, reading it or
writing it, focused on ideas within the text without reference to their effects on us students. One
professor in a contemporary American literature course even exclaimed, “Don’t ever begin a
comment in this class with ‘I feel!’” But, as I’ve discussed here, “I feel” begins the expression of
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rhetorical influence, a process that is pervasive. Indeed, the expression “I feel” begins the
process of transferring our emotional experiences we experience in relation to a text from the
realm of motion into the realm of action. As students reflect on how symbolic acts have motional
influence on them through the experience of form, they learn the need to make judgments and
choices about those experiences as they occur and after because their identities are at stake.
Through this practice, students learn how to operate within the realm of action, and specifically
in this case, how to take control of their identities by carefully choosing which emotions and
desires to accept. In this way, we teach students to take control of the development of who they
are and what they believe. Here it is in Burke’s terms:
[As] the individual learns to anticipate [others’] attitudes toward him . . . [he]
becomes aware of himself in terms of them (or generally, in terms of the ‘other’).
And his attitudes, being shaped by their attitudes as reflected in him, modify his
ways of action. Hence, in proportion, as he widens his social relations with
persons and things outside him, in learning how to anticipate their attitudes he
builds within himself a more complex set of attitudes, thoroughly social. The
complexity of social attitudes comprises the “self” (thus complexly erected atop
the purely biological motives, and in particular, modified by the formative effects
of language, or “vocal gestures,” which invites the individual to form himself in
keeping with its social directives). (Grammar 237)
Literature classes are the best place to reflect upon how others attitudes and symbolic acts
can shape our own emotions and identifications because the experience of form is intended to be
emotional and personal. As literature teachers help students practice making important and
meaningful judgments critical to the formation of their identities, they provide students with the
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kind of practice for making judgments that help students become more conscious and careful of
their identities outside the classroom. In this way, we teach students not just crucial thinking
skills, but critical life skills. And for Burke, this was the goal of education and the motive behind
much of his work.
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